Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Liberian civil war, groups of ex-combatants took control of natural resource enclaves. With some of them threatening a return to war, these groups were widely viewed as the most significant threats to Liberia’s hard-won peace. Building on fieldwork and socio-historical analysis, this study shows how extralegal groups emerge as a product of livelihood strategies and the political economy of war. It analyzes the trajectory of extralegal groups in three sectors of the Liberian economy: rubber, diamonds, and timber. The findings offer a counterpoint to the prevailing narrative, arguing that extralegal groups have a dual nature and should be viewed as accidental statebuilders driven to provide basic governance goods in order to create a stable commercial environment. These groups do not seek to rule; they provide governance because they need to trade—not as an end in itself. This leads to the book’s broader argument: it is trade, rather than war, that drives contemporary statebuilding. In areas where the state is weak and political authority is contested, where the rule of law is corrupt and government distrust runs deep, extralegal groups can provide order and dispute resolution, forming the basic kernel of the state. Extralegal groups also perform a series of hidden governance functions that establish public norms of compliance and cooperation with local populations. This sheds new light on how we understand violent nonstate actors, allowing us to view them as part of an evolutionary process of state-making, rather than simply as national security threats.