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Archaeology International
Architecture_MPS
Europe and the World: A law review
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History Education Research Journal
International Journal of Development Education and Global Learning
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Jewish Historical Studies: A Journal of English-Speaking Jewry
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The Journal of the Sylvia Townsend Warner Society
The London Journal of Canadian Studies
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About UCL Press
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The Encyclopedia of Public Choice
Interest Group Behavior and Influence
other
Author(s):
Frans van Winden
Publication date
(Print):
2004
Publisher:
Springer US
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Behavioral Public Administration
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Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Sam Peltzman
(1976)
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An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
S. Coate
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T. Besley
(1997)
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Affective and semantic components in political person perception.
Robert Abelson
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Susan Fiske
,
Mark D. Peters
…
(1982)
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Book Chapter
Publication date (Print):
2004
Pages
: 118-129
DOI:
10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_10
SO-VID:
82f1bc46-7eb6-43c7-a9e8-24333406b1fa
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Book chapters
pp. 3
Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy
pp. 32
Public Choice: An Introduction
pp. 49
Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct?
pp. 60
Constitutional Political Economy
pp. 67
Corruption
pp. 77
Dictatorship
pp. 91
Environmental Politics
pp. 96
Experimental Public Choice
pp. 105
Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation
pp. 118
Interest Group Behavior and Influence
pp. 129
International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade
pp. 139
James M. Buchanan
pp. 146
Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution
pp. 159
Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior
pp. 173
The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters
pp. 191
Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics
pp. 201
Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought
pp. 214
Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law
pp. 235
Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy
pp. 244
Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology
pp. 252
Public Finance
pp. 263
Regulation and Antitrust
pp. 284
Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson
pp. 286
Shadow Economy
pp. 296
Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling
pp. 305
Spatial Theory
pp. 312
Trade Liberalization and Globalization
pp. 321
William H. Riker
pp. 327
Academia
pp. 329
Al-Qaeda
pp. 333
Alternative Voting Methods
pp. 336
Altruism
pp. 341
The Anatomy of Political Representation
pp. 344
Approval Voting
pp. 346
Arbitration and Bargaining
pp. 349
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
pp. 351
An ‘Austrian’ Perspective on Public Choice
pp. 356
Autocracy
pp. 358
Autocratic Succession
pp. 363
Bicameralism
pp. 365
Blackmail
pp. 367
Black’s Single-Peakedness Condition
pp. 370
Budgetary Processes
pp. 373
Budget Deficits
pp. 377
Bureaucratic Discretion
pp. 383
Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance
pp. 386
Campaign Finance 1
pp. 390
Campaign Finance 2
pp. 393
Central Banks
pp. 398
Chicago Political Economy
pp. 399
The Clayton Act
pp. 402
Coalitions and Power Indices
pp. 407
Coalitions and Social Choice
pp. 409
Coase Theorem and Political Markets
pp. 415
Coercion
pp. 417
Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation
pp. 419
Committee Assignments
pp. 422
Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions
pp. 424
Committees in Legislatures
pp. 426
Commons and Anticommons
pp. 428
Constitution
pp. 429
Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress
pp. 430
The Constitution of the European Union
pp. 436
Constitutional Political Economy
pp. 440
The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy
pp. 445
Contractarianism
pp. 447
Corruption 1
pp. 450
Corruption 2
pp. 454
Cost and Choice
pp. 456
The Cost Disease of the Personal Services
pp. 460
Customary Law
pp. 464
The Demand-Revealing Process
pp. 466
Deregulation of Postal Service
pp. 470
Dictators and Social Contracts
pp. 473
Direct Democracy
pp. 477
Discrimination
pp. 481
Dynamic Inconsistency
pp. 485
Economic Freedom and its Measurement
pp. 487
Economic Freedom and Political Freedom
pp. 496
Economic Regulation
pp. 499
The Economic Theory of Clubs
pp. 504
Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy
pp. 507
Education and the State
pp. 510
Efficiency of Democracy
pp. 513
Efficiency of Democracy?
pp. 519
The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis
pp. 522
Elected Versus Appointed Regulators
pp. 525
Election Models
pp. 530
Electoral College
pp. 532
Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation
pp. 535
The Elusive Median Voter
pp. 537
Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle
pp. 540
Endogenous Morality
pp. 543
Enron
pp. 548
Environmental Politics and Economic Development
pp. 553
The Euro
pp. 554
European Political Integration
pp. 556
Evolution of Institutions
pp. 561
The Evolution of Law
pp. 564
Experimental Economics and Public Choice
pp. 567
Experimental Public Choice
pp. 569
Expressive Voting and Redistribution
pp. 572
Fair Division
pp. 574
Fame and Politics
pp. 575
Federal Reserve System
pp. 578
Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States
pp. 581
Game Theory
pp. 582
Game Theory in Public Choice
pp. 585
Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making
pp. 588
Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition
pp. 592
Growth of Local Government in the United States
pp. 594
The Growth of Public Expenditure
pp. 597
The Growth of the Relative Size of Government
pp. 603
Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution
pp. 605
Homo Economicus
pp. 608
Human Evolution and Political Behavior
pp. 615
Ideology
pp. 621
The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics
pp. 624
Initiative and Referendum
pp. 628
Institutions of Trade Protection
pp. 631
Interest Groups 1
pp. 636
Interest Groups 2
pp. 639
International Game of Power
pp. 643
International Organization
pp. 645
Internet Voting
pp. 647
Is Russia a Market Economy?
pp. 650
Is Voting Rational?
pp. 653
The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice
pp. 658
The Judiciary
pp. 665
The Law and Economics Movement
pp. 667
Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion
pp. 671
Legal Rules and Standards
pp. 674
Legislative Politics
pp. 677
Legislators
pp. 680
Leviathan Models of Government
pp. 684
Logic of Collective Action
pp. 687
The Logic of Liberty
pp. 696
Logrolling 1
pp. 699
Logrolling 2
pp. 702
Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown
pp. 704
The Median in Politics
pp. 707
The Median Voter Model
pp. 712
Medieval Church
pp. 713
Mercantilism
pp. 715
Monetary Politics
pp. 719
The New Deal
pp. 722
Nonprofit Organizations
pp. 725
The Origins of Social Choice Theory
pp. 728
The Paradox of Rebellion
pp. 731
Parchment Versus Guns
pp. 734
Political and Cultural Nationalism
pp. 736
Political Business Cycles
pp. 740
Political Economics and Public Choice
pp. 743
The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments
pp. 745
The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform
pp. 749
Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation
pp. 754
Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters
pp. 758
Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy
pp. 762
Prohibition
pp. 764
Public Choice and Socialism
pp. 769
Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust
pp. 773
Public Choice in Italy
pp. 775
Public Enterprise
pp. 778
Public Finance and the Median Voter Model
pp. 780
Public Finance in Democratic Process
pp. 782
Public Goods
pp. 784
Public Schools
pp. 787
Public Utility Regulation
pp. 790
Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History
pp. 793
Rational Ignorance
pp. 795
Rational Irrationality
pp. 797
Reciprocity
pp. 802
Redistributive Politics 1
pp. 804
Redistributive Politics 2
pp. 807
Regulating Government
pp. 809
Regulatory Takings
pp. 816
Rent Dissipation
pp. 818
Rent Extraction
pp. 820
Rent Seeking
pp. 824
Rent Seeking and Political Institutions
pp. 827
Rent-Seeking Games
pp. 829
Rent Seeking in Development
pp. 832
The Rule of Law
pp. 835
Rules Versus Standards
pp. 842
Self-Interest
pp. 844
Selfish Gene
pp. 845
September 11, 2001
pp. 849
Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems
pp. 853
The Social Cost of Rent Seeking
pp. 857
Sortition
pp. 860
Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons
pp. 863
State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity
pp. 865
Structure-Induced Equilibrium
pp. 867
Supply of Public Goods
pp. 872
The Supreme Court
pp. 876
Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price
pp. 880
Term Limits 1
pp. 882
Term Limits 2
pp. 885
Terrorism
pp. 890
The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom
pp. 892
Totalitarianism
pp. 897
Trade Protectionism
pp. 903
Transitional Economies
pp. 907
Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy
pp. 911
Triangulation
pp. 914
Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector
pp. 917
The Value of Voting Rights
pp. 919
Votes for Women
pp. 921
Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor
pp. 923
Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections
pp. 926
Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation
pp. 930
The War on Drugs
pp. 933
Welfare Economics and Public Choice
pp. 937
Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State
pp. 940
Why Government Succeeds
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