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      WHY CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE CANNOT BE INDIRECT

      The Cambridge Law Journal
      Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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          Abstract

          A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or “tracing” approach, namely an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it cannot account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it cannot account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be assessed relative to the defendant's evidence.

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          Punishment and Responsibility

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            Culpable Ignorance

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              Skepticism about Moral Responsibility

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                The Cambridge Law Journal
                C.L.J.
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                0008-1973
                1469-2139
                November 2021
                August 27 2021
                November 2021
                : 80
                : 3
                : 489-514
                Article
                10.1017/S0008197321000659
                048fe29b-1edd-4906-8ab5-1caab1f894f1
                © 2021

                https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

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