Introduction
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 was a salient event in the history of Christianity. The fall of the city marked the end of the Orthodox capital and the cessation of the Eastern Roman Empire. The Christian city, which was established over a millennium ago by Constantine, would soon be in the hands of the Ottomans. This time was a desperate one for all Christians of Europe, for a the fall of the former Christian capital would also enable Ottomans to establish a firm rooting within Christian territory. Despite such stakes, no attempts were successfully realized at having a united Christian front to face the Ottomans; further, the zeal crusading armies once had could no longer be ignited. Instead, we see tensions between the Orthodox and Latin churches become increasingly apparent. On the eve of the conquest, the commander-in-chief of the Byzantine navy said, “Better the turban of the Turk than the tiara of the Latin [Pope]”. 1 The Orthodox realized any call for Latin help would necessarily require doctrinal compromise as well. Rather than submit to the supremacy of the Pope, the Orthodox realized the city falling to Ottoman control was perhaps not the worst outcome.
The heart of the tension was a theological one. The Orthodox were firm on their creed and we will come to see how they refused any compromise with the Latin West. Even at the pleas of the Byzantine Emperor and the presence of the Ottomans at the walls, the Orthodox clergy refused to bend to the doctrine of the West. They knew the Ottomans, despite being of a foreign religion, would require no such theological compromise.
This schism between Orthodox and Latin Christianity is significant for any discussion of the historical dynamics of Christianity. In contemporary scholarship about the history of Christian Islamophobia, many authors when describing the period largely ignore this inter-Christian tension. Some authors of this bent are Anidjar, Kumar, Todd, and Allen. For instance, in Anidjar’s book The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy, he argues his case with the claim from another author that Muslims were a “common enemy” against all of Christendom (Anidjar 2003). 2 Views like the above quote suggest that aside from an external Muslim enemy, Christianity was a united whole; however, this statement should also be qualified by acknowledging inter-Christian tensions which were as significant as any foreign threat. I will argue that while the Byzantine Orthodox and Latin West both viewed the Muslims as an enemy, the idea of theological compromise with the Latins was seen by the Orthodox as a worse alternative to a Muslim conquest. I will also make the case that such a dynamic should be adequately captured in Islamophobia literature describing the period and the construction of Christianity—which has been depicted overly monolithically in current literature.
For the rest of the article, I will describe various Christian attitudes towards the Ottoman invaders (while primarily focusing on the Orthodox reception). By presenting their views, I hope to show the Ottomans were perceived as a fatal end, but not the worst outcome possible. Orthodox authorities perceived an invasion by the Latins as worse, for they would not afford them autonomy which might be hoped under Muslims. The land might remain under Christian rule, but the Orthodox churches would have to yield to papal supremacy. While the Muslim conquest might lead to a change of the head of state, the churches would not be forced to make any doctrinal changes or alter their church hierarchy. By illustrating these tensions, we will then return to the Islamophobia discourse and show how these internal tensions must be admitted in a portrayal of the history of Islamophobia.
The Fall of Constantinople
The fall of Constantinople was a pivotal moment in Christian history. The Orthodox would lose their capital and the rest of Christian Europe now had the Ottomans on their doorstep. In the years before the conquest, many Christian leaders tried to prevent this invasion, for they knew the consequences would be severe across all Christian lands. In an effort to oppose the Ottomans, Enea Silvio Bartolomeo Piccolomini (the future Pope Pius II) tried to exhort all Christians to mount an offensive against the Ottomans. 3 Like the crusades, some hoped Christian polities would look past their differences and come to the aid of the Orthodox Byzantine Christians in this dire hour. Another figure was King George of Kunštát and Poděbrady of Bohemia who—seeing the Ottomans surround Constantinople—also tried to promote the idea of a Pan-Christian resistance to the onslaught of the Muslim forces. 4 Christian kings like him were hoping to align with other kingdoms and the papal forces for a group onslaught against the Ottomans. However, such armies never materialized, but more importantly, the Latin West lacked the crusading enthusiasm seen a few centuries earlier. This lowly zeal and lack of cohesion saliently have their origins in the tension between Latin and Orthodox clergy.
Orthodox clergy at this time were quite opposed to the Latins whom they saw as potentially posing a greater threat to their creed than the Ottomans. Patriarch Michael III expressed his aversion at attempts by the Pope to claim authority over all Christians by saying, “Let the Muslim be my material ruler, rather than the Latin my spiritual master. If I am subject to the former, at least he will not force me to share his faith. But if I have to be united in religion with the latter, under his control, I may have to separate myself from God.” 5 This quote came from the head Orthodox authority of the time and shows the apprehension Orthodox churches had of a Latin occupation. The Orthodox knew that while the Muslim might bring a change of head of state, they could hope to retain church autonomy as observed in other places ruled by Ottomans like the Ionian islands. 6 Latin forces—mounted together by the order of the Pope—on the other hand would require submission to papal authority as the supreme voice of the church: a creed the Orthodox hoped to never submit to.
Others shared the worries of Patriarch Michael III, Grand Duke Loukas Notaras was one such person who also preferred to see a Muslim rule rather than a Latin one. He was a prominent Byzantine official and had the position of megas doux (commander-in-chief of the Byzantine navy) and mesazon (chief minister of the Byzantine empire). On the eve of the conquest of the city by the Ottomans he declared, “Better the turban of the Turk than the tiara of the Latin [Pope].” 7 His statement once again admits that while the Muslims are foreign, they perhaps would bring benefits for Orthodox Christianity which could not be had under the Pope. Most notably, the Latin doctrine differed from the Orthodox in regard to papal supremacy, the filioque clause, and unleavened bread. 8 With these tensions unresolved between the churches, the Ottomans may have been seen as a means to avoid a forced compromise which Latin rule might bring about. The Ottomans on the other hand would only impose a tax upon the Christian population. This financial subservience was the only toll they had to pay to the Ottomans, and perhaps this option was more economical than changing their creed under a Latin reign.
Animosity was also harbored on the Latin side. Petrarch, the famous Latin humanist, said, “The Turks are enemies, but the Greeks are schismatics and worse than enemies”. 9 The Latins had no interest in fighting a war with someone who might be as bitter in reception to them as the Turks. Indeed, often the discourse of the Byzantines towards the West labeled them as heretics and one patriarch, Gennadios II Scholarios, labeled the Pope as a beast of the end times. 10 Likely due to the tensions above, the Pope was unable to put together an effective army to save the Byzantines. 11 Further, he no longer had the crusading appeal his office once afforded him. Without obeisance to the Pope, the army could not be assembled, and the efforts were quickly dissolved.
We should also mention here the public’s attitude toward the invading Ottoman army. While the Orthodox clergy preferred the rule of the Sultan to that of the Pope, some of the laity under the fear of threat uttered, “Would that the City were delivered into the hands of the Latins who call upon Christ and the Theotokos, and not thrown into the clutches of the infidel.” 12 This attitude shows the Orthodox reception to the Ottomans was not universally well received. Some still preferred the rulership of another Christian even if it meant slightly changing their doctrine of belief. Perhaps to laity who did not devote their lives to studying and defending the orthodox creed, a small change of words in one’s doctrine was seen as insignificant The Ottomans were therefore not universally seen as a positive change, rather they might be a worse consequence for some Christians. Possibly, having a Christian authority ruling over them was more significant than having a foreign religious ruler. Any credal compromises could be swallowed, but functioning as a subject of a Muslim ruler was entirely unpalatable.
In response to these attitudes of the public, the clergy sometimes warned against Latin rhetoric. Joseph Bryennius, a Byzantine theologian said, “Let no one be deceived by delusive hopes that the Italian allied troops will sooner or later come to us. But if they do pretend to rise to defend us, they will take arms in order to destroy our city, race, and name.” 13 The military aid of the Latin might push off the Ottoman threat, but this assistance would have far worse consequence than those the rule of the Ottomans would have. Indeed, the Latins would require doctrinal subordination and recognition of papal superiority. Perhaps when making this statement he feared the catholic normative idea for all to be under papal authority; such was the attitude Orthodox clergy would have observed at the Council of Florence. Before any alliance could be forged with the Pope, compromise had to be allowed with regard to Orthodox doctrine.
We will now mention the councils of Basel and Florence where, in response to the looming Ottoman threat, the Orthodox and Latin churches attempted to reconcile. The Emperor, in particular, saw this agreement as necessary to ensure survival. 14,15 In order to resist the onslaught of the Ottomans, he required external help, but the Papal forces and the aid of the Latin West would only come through a theological union. The Pope offered his help to the Byzantine Emperor, but only on condition they submit and agree to credal compromise. 16 In light of this hope, a council was called for, first in Basel and later in Ferrara and finally moved to Florence. During the council, three chief doctrinal issues were discussed, the issue of filioque clause, unleavened bread, and papal authority.
At the end of the council most of the Byzantines had agreed to the compromises. One of the participants opposed to union, Patriarch Joseph, died before the negotiations finished. 17 Thus, by the conclusion of the meeting, only a singular dissenter, Mark of Ephesus, remained from the Orthodox delegation. Perhaps the most important aspect of the declaration was a recognition of the Pope as the “head of the whole church.” 18 The Emperor signed the declaration and headed back to Constantinople where he hoped the city would receive it warmly. Shortly after returning to the city, the declaration was read aloud in the Cathedral of the Assumption. However, rather than being met with a welcome reception, most of the Orthodox clergy of the city refused to submit to the new declaration and instead gathered around the singular dissenter, Mark of Ephesus. Following this cold reception, many of the signatories who were present in Florence also reneged. 19
While a union was achieved on paper in Florence, the Orthodox clergy begrudged these new doctrinal commitments and so abandoned them. The impending Ottoman threat was far less potent than yielding to Latin decrees in order to receive their aid. Saliently, the Orthodox refused to compromise with Latin authorities, despite the looming threat of invasion. The bitterness towards the Pope was greater than their enmity to the invading Sultan. Such attitudes suggest inner dissension was greater than any idea of unity against a single enemy.
Eventually in 1453, despite the efforts of the Emperor to call upon last minute Latin help, the city fell to Mehmet II. His conquest was similar to the Ottoman takeover of other cities. After distributing the spoils, he called for peace with the Christians and all religious sects in the city. 20 Aside from changing the Hagia Sophia to a mosque, most other churches were granted protection and remained under Christian denomination and management. 21 Further, he allowed for the Orthodox to maintain their autonomy and appointed Gennadios II Scholarios as the new patriarch of Constantinople. 22 He was a staunch anti-unionist and saw the Pope as a far worse alternative to the Sultan. Gennadios saw the best hopes of Orthodox continuity as under the rule of the Ottoman state. 23 He informed his subjects to not revolt against the new foreign ruler but rather continue their practices as Christians unabated with none of their rituals or creeds changed. 24 Gennadios also helped Sultan Mehmet II to develop the millet system which would define how Orthodox were to be treated under ottoman rule.
The millet system may have been another factor as to why Orthodox (and particularly the clergy) preferred the Muslim rulers to the Latins. The millet system allowed for each religious community within the city to have their own courts and religious hierarchy and educational systems. For example, for the Jews a chief haham was appointed, the Armenians were appointed a catholicos to lead them, and the Orthodox were appointed a patriarch who would administer that section’s affairs. All the religious leaders fell under the personal protection of the Sultan and no other part of the population or government could infringe upon them. 25 This secular form of protection may have been the hidden hope of the Orthodox clergy in the face of the invasion. A Muslim rule is more foreign to that of a Christian rule, but the Muslim Sultan would remain a material ruler and not a spiritual imposer. Thus, the Orthodox church retained virtually all the traditional apparatus of their administration without having to compromise and alter a part of their beliefs or practice. As the millet system was a contractual relationship, the Orthodox only had to pay a tax in order to have their right to independence and practice Christianity the way they wished. No papal authorities would monitor or censor Orthodox doctrines; in this regard the Ottomans were a convenient buffer against Latin interference.
Despite the Ottomans adhering to a foreign religion, they allowed the Orthodox to practice their creed free from the intrusion of the Latins. As one later Orthodox authority, Patriarch Anthimos of Jerusalem, said in 1798, “it was through the particular favor of heaven that the Ottoman empire had been raised to protect the Greeks against heresy, as a safeguard against the politics of the western nations, and as champion of the Roman Orthodox church.” 26 The Ottomans provided a bubble and protection to the Orthodox from the intrusions of the Latins into Orthodox affairs. The Orthodox could practice how they willed. Most clearly in contrast with the Latins, the Muslims did not require the Orthodox clergy to admit that the Sultan was the ultimate religious authority. The Latins on the other hand had previously attempted to require that the Orthodox recognize papal supreme authority in order to receive military reinforcement. 27 With Constantinople under papal rule perhaps the clergy feared an end to their autonomy. An enemy who shares your religion appears to be worse than an enemy with a foreign religion.
Christianity in Modern Islamophobia Discourse
Having seen the dissenting attitudes present during the fall of Constantinople, we can see the theological divisions within Christianity were so great, not even the threat of a Muslim invasion would convince them to accept theological compromise. With this information, I will now show how it bears significance on the discussion found in modern scholarship on Islamophobia, which, when describing the history of Islamophobia, often and frequently ignore such tensions. These authors end up reading Christianity as being more unified than it is. By examining these historical portrayals of Islamophobia, I hope to argue that while Islam has been viewed as an enemy by Christendom, the theological dissension within Christianity sometimes caused Christian churches to view each other as worse than a foreign enemy. Relative to the threat of a Muslim invasion, the thought of accepting another’s creed could be seen as more disruptive.
A question may arise as to whether the Orthodox clergy were referring to Muslims or Turks in their discourse. In the former reading, they would see the invading Ottomans as a manifestation of Islam and in its essence a Muslim enterprise. On the latter reading, they would view the Ottomans as any other racial group like how they saw the Mongols. Scholars like Kalmar note that while the term Turk was often used to designate the Ottoman forces, it was used because Turks were the prototypical Muslims of the time period. 28
We will now return to modern characterization of the history of Islamophobia and see where they make generalizations in terms of the above historical narrative. When considering the work by Gil Anidjar, by citing another author in The Jew, the Arab a History of the Enemy (Anidjar 2003), he supports the idea that Christianity often calls Muslims the “common enemy” of all of Christendom. 29 In his work, when describing the medieval period of Muslim–Christian relations, in support of his view he cites another work which states that Muslims have been constructed as the “normative enemies of Christianity and Christendom.” 30 However, he does not qualify this quote by mentioning the tensions between Orthodox and Latin clergy. During the fall of Constantinople such divisions were lucidly apparent and remained till the very end an obstacle between the full aid and empathy of the Latin West.
Other authors like Kumar do take note that at times the Orthodox Christians preferred the Ottomans to the Latins. She states that in face of the oppression the Orthodox faced under Latin rule, they perceived Ottoman religious tolerance as far more attractive. Hoping for this better treatment by the Ottomans, many from the population preferred this possibility of autonomy to that of a papal rule. 31 While Kumar acknowledges the divide, she does not mention its theological origin, nor does she note the intensity of it. In regards to the doctrinal differences of the Latins, some Orthodox had particularly staunch views. Patriarch Michael I Cerularius would state that Latin interpolations in the doctrine of the filioque constituted, “an evil and even the worst of evils.” 32 While the Orthodox did see the Muslims as a threat, the danger posed by them could never be enough to require a compromise in doctrine. The Orthodox held so firmly on to their sense and definition of Christianity, despite the presence of a “common enemy,” the Orthodox refused to yield to the conditions of the Latin West for military aid. While some Orthodox clergy did make way for union with the Latin church at the Council of Florence, when they arrived back to Constantinople, most reneged their signatures. 33 Such divisions must be highlighted in developing an account of the historical dynamics of Christianity.
Additional authors on the topic include Green and Allen who also do not bring to light the fullness of the theological dissension present in Christianity. Green (2015), when describing Christian attitudes towards the ever increasing presence of the Ottomans, states that Christians, “increasingly saw in Islam a formidable threat to Christianity’s claims of superiority and hegemony in Europe”. 34 Further, while he mentions that the Ottomans were frequently invoked to rally support for wars, he does not mention that some Christian factions, particularly the Orthodox Byzantines, preferred the Ottomans to the Latins. Allen (2010) seems to portray Christians in a similar light as Green by mentioning instances of a united Christian front against Muslims, such as in the first crusade. However, he then fails to mention the internal Christian tensions which are readily apparent during the sack of Constantinople in 1204 at the time of the fourth crusade or the attitudes of Orthodox clergy at the eve of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans. 35 Such readings by Green and Allen leave out an important aspect of describing the history of Islamophobia. By failing to mention the internal theological tensions of Christianity, they are reading Christianity as more united than it historically was.
Perhaps discourse on the history of Islamophobia would be more informed by allowing for the existence of multiple adversaries. On this criterion, the Muslims would remain an enemy for they differed in religion and were threatening conquest of Christian lands. Further, with this reading, we can also have the Latins act as enemies for the Orthodox and vice versa. For instance, the Pope only offered military aid if the Orthodox would agree to a doctrinal compromise. The subsequent refusal of the Orthodox to this condition, despite the Ottoman invasion looming overhead, shows that the animosity between Christian sects can be greater than any external religious threat. We also see the relative attitude towards adversities is not fixed; sometimes the Muslims are a greater threat—as seen in the first crusade—while sometimes the Latins are a greater threat—as seen through statements by Orthodox clergy during the Ottoman conquest.
In addition to allowing for multiple adversaries, we may also wish to allow for neutral partners. Historically, Christians sometimes lived under Muslim domains and protection. For example, after the conquest of Constantinople, since the Orthodox no longer had access to the instruments of running a state, they had to accept the autonomy under the millet system of the Ottomans. The dynamics of this relationship were defined by a tax paid by the Orthodox and in return they had protection and freedom to practice their religion. Later Christian authorities would sometimes even praise this system. In the eighteenth century, the patriarch of Jerusalem believed the hosting by the Ottomans was a special grace from God, for the Orthodox were protected from the heresies and political meddling of the Latin west. 36 In these cases, the Muslim, once an enemy, now becomes a convenient buffer to protect one from the credal impositions of others.
Another issue which authors like Anidjar, Kumar, Green, and Allen do not take into consideration is that of papal authority. As seen in the case of the fall of Constantinople, the Pope played a role in furthering the split in Orthodox and Latin Christianity rather than acting as a unifying figure in that tumultuous time. This major decisive and splitting factor between Orthodox and Latin Christianity should feature prominently in any history of Islamophobia. The Pope was sometimes as hated as Islam. As Patriarch Gennadios II Scholarios thought, both the Pope and Islam were beasts from the end of times. 37 This attitude is significant for it shows both the Pope and Islam as being apocalyptic. In this case Christianity has little to evince in terms of a united front against Islam. If the schism was this severe, a more careful history of Islamophobia might treat Latin views of Islam distinct from Orthodox views towards Islam. This antagonistic attitude is also manifested at the first sacking of Constantinople in 1204. The Orthodox were forcible subjected to the crusaders, who were under papal authority, and abused their power to instead seize Constantinople, a treachery which the Byzantines never forgot. To make matters worse, the Pope never came to the aid of the Orthodox, but rather hoped the move would expand his sphere of influence. 38 Such conflicts between the Orthodoxy and the Pope are indicative of an internal enemy within Christianity which needs as much explication as the external enemy represented by Islam.
The last point of consideration is how such generalizations of Christianity arose in modern discourse on the history of Islamophobia. Why are Orthodox and Latin divisions not given more attention? Perhaps one reason for this reading by contemporary authors is the secular nature of relations among Christian countries today. Previously, the Orthodox could not hope to practice their creed of Christianity under a Latin government; often the Latin authorities were greatly oppressive towards the Orthodox in their lands. 39 However, now with the widespread emergence of secular principles at the head of the state (including the separation of church and state), having two denominations practicing aside each other becomes more tolerable. No impetus is seen by the government to interfere or change a group’s creed. In contrast to today, the Latin and Byzantine governments were theocratic. Hence, most of the time an alliance would imply theological conditions as well. But in more recent times, economic and political factors play a far greater role in the modern state than having all constituents adhere to the same denomination of Christianity.
Another proposal might be the overly focused account on Islam found in these author’s works. For example, another author on the topic, Kumar (2012), spends the majority of her work focusing on the Muslim subject and only devotes a single page to describing the theological tension and schism between Orthodox and Latin Christianity. By focusing on the relations between Islam and Christianity, often inter-Christian relations become lost. This mode of presentation has some benefits, for indeed, all of Christianity saw Muslims as enemies. Despite the inner conflicts of Christianity, they would verbally agree that Islam was their adversary. The account only falls apart when judgment is applied as to which enemy is worse, the foreign one or the one sharing your religion. A more informed account can be had if we first observe the theological schisms within Christianity. Only then can we make a more evaluative and precise judgment as to how each group within Christianity viewed Muslims. We should no longer see Christianity as represented by one set of attitudes, but each denomination should be examined for its distinct views.
Conclusion
In the course of the discussion, we described how careful one should be when describing the dynamics of Christianity. As seen during the fall of Constantinople, despite a “common enemy” being on the verge of conquering a major Christian city, the Orthodox and Latins refused to compromise on their doctrines or send aid. The tension was so severe many Orthodox clergy even preferred a takeover by the Ottomans to that of the Latins for at least theological autonomy would be guaranteed by the former. While attempts were made at finding a theological middle ground in order to receive Latin aid, such agreements were met with a distasteful reception by the majority of Orthodox clergy.
By studying the theological dynamics of Christianity at the time of the fall of Constantinople, we see that the schism within the religion was perceived as a greater threat than that of a foreign invasion. As long as the Muslim foreign invader would grant them protection to practice their religion, as seen under the millet system, the Orthodox were relatively receptive towards having the Ottomans as material rulers in contrast to the Latins.
This tension has relevance to modern scholarship on the history of Christian Islamophobia. Often authors paint Christians and Christendom as a single united entity, however, such generalizations ignore the prominence of theological tension within, even during times when one would most expect all of Christianity to be united against an adversary. I hope to have shown how such authors take Christianity as more unified than it was; only by acknowledging and moving beyond this generalization of Christian unity can we have a more nuanced discourse. History instead shows that perhaps a foreign religious enemy is better than a co-religious enemy.