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      Party Strength and Economic Growth

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          Abstract

          While a large literature suggests an important role for political parties in development, this article is the first attempt to layout and test a comprehensive theory connecting parties to economic growth. The authors argue that strong parties broaden the constituencies to which policymakers respond and help politicians solve coordination problems. These features help to ensure better economic management, public services, and political stability. And this, in turn, enhances economic growth. Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varieties of Democracy data set, the authors test this theory on data drawn from more than 150 countries observed annually from 1901–2010. They identify a sizeable effect that is robust to various specifications, estimators, and samples. The effect operates in both democracies and autocracies, and is fairly stable across regions and time periods.

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          Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models

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            A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth

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              Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

              The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                World Politics
                World Pol.
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                0043-8871
                1086-3338
                April 2018
                March 06 2018
                April 2018
                : 70
                : 2
                : 275-320
                Article
                10.1017/S0043887117000375
                72218def-62d2-4d60-a843-0eff4ebd94c6
                © 2018

                https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

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